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Abstract
Public expenditure is ineciently low when a benevolent government can only commit to
policies within a period. If the government loses the ability to commit within-period, then it
stops internalizing some of the distortions created by current policy. Thus, to counterbalance the
costs of future distortions, it increases public good provision, which may improve welfare. For
a calibrated economy, removing within-period commitment implies a welfare gain worth half-a-
percent of yearly consumption. A similar gain can be obtained, if instead, capital depreciation
were allowed to be fully deducted from taxable income. However, enacting both reforms may
lead to large welfare losses.
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11 Introduction
In modern developed economies, scal budgets are typically proposed and approved on an annual
basis. This suggests the presence of institutions that endow the government with the ability to
\commit" to specic policies, at least for a certain period of time. For example, in the U.S., the
President submits a federal budget to Congress for approval before the start of the scal year.
In addition, both chambers of Congress are required to submit concurrent budget resolutions.
There are, however, mechanisms that allow the government to exercise ex-post discretion, such as
supplemental appropriation and emergency bills. These may be so signicant or frequent that they
render the idea of commitment as largely illusory.
Whether some commitment|or a mechanism that substitutes for it|is available or not depends
on the institutional design of an economy. Institutions may be strong enough to make policy
announcements, such as an approved budget, binding obligations. This strength may be eroded
over time by continually exercising ex-post discretion. Similarly, times of great stress|such as a
national emergency or a nancial crisis|may induce politicians to implement bolder changes to pre-
announced policy. Recent examples in the U.S. include the several tax provisions and supplemental
spending enacted in response to the 2001 and 2007-09 recessions.1
In this paper, I study how the degree of commitment aects government policy and general
welfare. Specically, I analyze the determination of government policy in a standard neoclassical
growth model, where a benevolent government provides a public good nanced with income taxes.
Critically, the government cannot commit to policy choices in future periods, and mechanisms that
could substitute for commitment (e.g., reputation) are not operative. Under these assumptions, I
consider two alternative institutional scenarios. In the rst case, following Klein et al. (2008), the
government can commit to policies announced at the beginning of each period, i.e., has access to
within-period commitment. In the second case, the government lacks within-period commitment
and chooses period policy at the same time as factor markets operate and production takes place.
After period policy is revealed, agents makes their consumption and savings decisions. In the
context of the neoclassical growth model, the latter timing of events implies that the tax base
and tax rate are determined simultaneously. The critical dierence between the two institutional
regimes is that, when the government lacks within-period commitment, it does not internalize the
distortionary eect of taxation on the current labor supply or, equivalently, the consumption-leisure
choice.2
When the government has within-period commitment, it smoothes current and future policy
distortions. Current distortions are directly created by current policy. Future distortions are created
by future policy, and therefore, induced by current capital accumulation, which in turn is aected
by both current and future policy. Since taxes are distortionary, a standard result in this type of
setting is an ineciently low provision of public goods|see Klein et al. (2008) and Martin (2010).
If the government loses its ability to commit within the period, then it no longer internalizes the
1A case in point, the dierence between the actual U.S. decit in the scal year 2009 and the gure projected in
the original budget proposal was one trillion dollars. See Taylor (2011) for a discussion on the recent scal stimulus
packages.
2Note that, within the context of this paper, there is no corresponding distortion on capital since it is supplied
inelastically within a period. Capital accumulation is however distorted by future income taxes. In more general
environments, income taxes can also distort the current supply of capital. One example is to allow for variable capital
utilization as in Greenwood et al. (1988); see Zhu (1995) and Martin (2010) for applications.
2distortion created on current labor supply, which leads it to increase the provision of public goods,
to counterbalance the costs of future distortions. This results in higher tax rates.
For an economy calibrated to the postwar U.S., losing within-period commitment is welfare im-
proving. That is, the gains from a more ecient supply of public goods more than compensates the
costs of higher taxes. The welfare gain is equivalent to a permanent increase in private consumption
by 0:52%. Clearly, these gains depend on how far we are from the ecient supply of public goods
before the regime changes. Economies where the optimal size of government is smaller, report lower
improvements from losing within-period commitment.
The welfare properties of within-period commitment are closely tied to deductions on taxable
income. In particular, the capital depreciation allowance directly aects the tax base, and thus, has
signicant implications on the magnitude of policy distortions and how they are managed by the
government. I show that a similar welfare gain can be obtained if, instead of losing commitment,
the government increases the capital depreciation tax deduction from the post-war average of about
43% all the way up to 100%. This gain arises because a lower taxable income translates into a
smaller intertemporal savings distortion.
Given the results described in the preceding paragraphs, one may be inclined to conclude that
a desirable institutional reform would involve both removing the government's ability to commit
within a period and increasing the capital depreciation allowance to 100%. This would be incorrect
in some cases. For the benchmark calibration, such a reform would actually lead to a welfare loss
worth about 2% of consumption. The combined eects of a higher incentive to tax and a lower tax
base result in distortions large enough to overcome the gains from higher public good provision.
The way I model lack of within-period commitment, as described above, departs from previous
work. Most notably, Ortigueira (2006), building on earlier work by Turnovsky and Brock (1980)
and Judd (1998), assumes that government policy is implemented at the same time as households
choose consumption, leaving savings to be determined residually to satisfy their budget constraint.
There is an analogous case, where instead, consumption is left as a residual. One could raise several
conceptual concerns on this earlier approach. First, the modeler has to arbitrarily assume whether
consumption or savings are determined residually, once government policy is known. Second, the
welfare implications of institutional reform are necessarily vague; e.g., if the government loses the
ability to commit within a period, which of the two cases with lack of within-period commitment
arises? Finally, the approach implicitly assumes that households commit to a spending or savings
decision before taxes are known, instead of waiting for policy to be revealed before actions are nal-
ized. It appears more plausible that households are able to defer at least part of their consumption
and investment decisions for after tax rates are known.
Some recent studies on scal policy with limited commitment oer alternative takes on the
timing of government actions. Klein and R os-Rull (2003) assume the current government decides
on today's labor taxes and tomorrow's capital taxes. Ortigueira and Pereira (2008) assume within-
period commitment for incomes taxes, but not for debt issuance. Debortoli and Nunes (2010)
propose an intermediate approach to intertemporal commitment, by modeling an economy in which
the opportunity to re-optimize policy arrives stochastically. If we consider the benchmark case of a
government with access to within-period commitment only, Debortoli and Nunes study the eects
of increasing commitment, whereas this paper, same as Ortigueira's, analyzes the eects of reducing
it.
3The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment and characterizes gov-
ernment policy for the two cases considered. Section 3 conducts the numerical evaluation of the
model, including policy experiments and alternative specications. Section 4 concludes. The ap-
pendix covers alternative implementations of lack of within-period commitment, as described above.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of identical households. Time is discrete and
indexed by t = 0;1;:::;1. Households are endowed with one unit of time per period for work and
leisure, and may accumulate capital, which depreciates at rate  2 [0;1] every period.




where  2 (0;1) is the discount factor, c is consumption of an homogenous private good, n is
labor and G is consumption of a public good. The instantaneous utility function u is continuously
dierentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave in all its arguments.
Firms maximize prots and use capital and labor as inputs. The production function is con-
stant returns to scale and given by F(k;n), where F is dierentiable, strictly concave and strictly
increasing in both arguments. Factor markets are perfectly competitive.
The government supplies the public good, nanced with revenue from taxes  on household
income. As in Ortigueira (2006), Klein et al. (2008) and Martin (2010), among many others, there
is no government debt. Using upper-case letters to denote aggregate allocations, the government
period budget constraint is
Gt = t(F(Kt;Nt)   Kt);
where  2 [0;1] is the capital depreciation allowance in taxable income. Typically, taxation models
assume this allowance to be either zero or 100%. Actual tax codes only allow some types of capital
depreciation to be deducted and then according to specic schedules, which may not correspond to
the actual \economic" depreciation. As we shall see below, the value of  has an important eect
on equilibrium policy since it aects the tax base.3
Given factor prices rt and wt, and income taxes t, the budget constraint of the household is
ct + kt+1 = (1   t)((rt   )kt + wtnt) + (1   (1   ))kt: (1)
For any given sequence of factor prices and government policy, frt;wt;t;Gtg1
t=0, and initial
capital k0, household behavior can be characterized by a sequence fct;kt+1;ntg1
t=0 that satises (1)
3See Guo and Lansing (1997) and Guo and Lansing (1999) for an analysis of the eects of the depreciation
allowance in a standard Ramsey model of optimal taxation. See also Pecorino (1993) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995)
for how tax structure aects growth.
4and the familiar rst-order conditions from the household's optimization problem:
 uc(ct;1   nt;Gt) + uc(ct+1;1   nt+1;Gt+1)[1   (1   ) + (1   t+1)(rt+1   )] = 0 (2)
uc(ct;1   nt;Gt)(1   t)wt   u`(ct;1   nt;Gt) = 0; (3)
where uc and u` are the derivatives of the utility function with respect to consumption and leisure,
respectively.
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, factor prices are equal to their respective marginal products. Thus,
rt = FK(Kt;Nt) and wt = FN(Kt;Nt), where Fi is the derivative of F(K;N) with respect to
argument i = fK;Ng. Consistency dictates ct = Ct, kt+1 = Kt+1 and nt = Nt. From the










+ (1   )Kt   Kt+1   Gt:
Using these equilibrium conditions, (2) and (3) become
 uc
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F(Kt;Nt) + (1   )Kt   Kt+1   Gt;1   Nt;Gt

= 0;
which can be written compactly as
(Kt;Kt+1;Kt+2;Nt;Nt+1;Gt;Gt+1) = 0 (4)
	(Kt;Kt+1;Nt;Gt) = 0: (5)
Given initial aggregate capital K0 and a sequence of public expenditure fGtg1
t=0, a competitive
equilibrium is characterized by a sequence fKt+1;Ntg1
t=0 that satises (4) and (5) for all t =
0;1;:::;1. Below, we shall study how government expenditure is determined.
2.3 Government Policy
Assume the government is benevolent but cannot commit to policies beyond the current period.
Furthermore, focus on the case when governments base their decisions solely on fundamentals.4
4Below, in order to compare the dierent tax regimes analytically, I will further rene the equilibrium concept
to include only equilibria which are the limit of nite horizon equilibria. This requirement alone rules out the type
of equilibria studied by Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), among others, which require an
innite horizon.
5Thus, let us analyze Markov-perfect equilibria, i.e., equilibria where aggregate household behavior
and government policy depend only on the aggregate capital stock. Given this approach, I will
formulate the problem of the government recursively.5
The limited commitment assumption still leaves open the question of how much commitment the
government has within a period. For example, can the government commit to policy announcements
made at the beginning of the period or does it lack even this small amount of commitment? If so,
how do events unravel in a period?
The recent literature on Markov-perfect taxation has focused on two cases. For example, Klein
et al. (2008), Martin (2010) and Azzimonti et al. (2009) consider the case when the government
can commit to policy announcements within a period. Ortigueira (2006), based on earlier work
by Turnovsky and Brock (1980) and Judd (1998), proposes an alternative environment where
households choose consumption and labor at the same time as the government chooses the tax
rate, and thus, savings are left as a residual to satisfy the household's budget constraint. There is
a similar case one could analyze in which, instead, consumption is left as a residual|see Appendix
A.
One drawback with the way lack of within-period commitment has been modeled, as described
above, is that one has to arbitrarily assume whether consumption or savings are determined resid-
ually, once government policy is known. Moreover, why would households commit to all their
spending or savings decision before taxes are known, instead of waiting for policy to be revealed
before actions are nalized?
In this paper, I consider two cases to analyze the eects on policy and welfare of within-period
commitment. In the rst environment, following Klein et al. (2008), the government has the ability
to commit to a policy at the beginning of the period. I.e., it has within-period commitment. Thus,
G and by implication , are determined at the beginning of each period, before households make
any decisions. In this case, the government fully internalizes the eects of its period policy on the
decisions of households.
In the second environment, the government chooses policy at the same time as factor markets
operate. In other words, the tax rate and the tax base are determined simultaneously. Subsequently,
households decide on consumption and savings. In this case, the government does not internalize
the eects of its policy on factor markets and production. In particular, given that capital is
supplied inelastically, the government takes the labor supply as given. This scenario avoids making
an arbitrary choice about whether consumption or savings are determined residually, since both are
chosen after tax rates are announced, while it preserves the notion that governments can wait until
some economic decisions are made, before setting a policy for the period. Note that an equivalent
formulation consists of having the government set policy after factor markets close, but before
goods markets open.
Given the assumptions on the environment, from the point of view of an individual household,
there is no distinction between observing the actual tax rate for the period and (correctly) antic-
ipating it. Thus, in both institutional scenarios, household's behavior is characterized by (4) and
(5). The dierence lies in which households' responses to current policy will be internalized by the
government.
5See Maskin and Tirole (2001) for a denition and justication of Markov-perfect equilibria.
62.4 Within-period commitment: \government-moves-rst"
Consider rst the case when the government commits to policy announcements within a period,
which corresponds to the environment analyzed by Klein et al. (2008). When the government makes
its announcement it needs to take into account how household will react in the current period, i.e.,
how consumption, labor and savings decisions will be aected by current taxes, given anticipated
future policy.
Adopting what is known in the optimal taxation literature as the primal approach, we can
write the government's problem as choosing current K0, N and G, subject to households behaving
competitively, as characterized by (4) and (5), and given future anticipated policy G(K), which in
turn, implements household behavior characterized by N(K) and H(K), and provides net present
value utility V(K).
The problem of the government can be written as
max
K0;N;G
u(F(K;N) + (1   )K   G   K0;1   N;G) +  V(K0)
subject to
(K;K0;H(K0);N;N(K0);G;G(K0)) = 0 (6)
	(K;K0;N;G) = 0: (7)
Denition 1 When the government is endowed with within-period commitment, a Markov-perfect
equilibrium is a set of functions fH;N;G;Vg : R+ ! R+[0;1]R+R, such that for all K > 0:
(i) fH(K);N(K);G(K)g = argmaxfK0;N;Gg u(F(K;N)+(1 )K  G K0;1 N;G)+V(K0)
subject to (6) and (7);
(ii) V(K) = u
 
F(K;N(K)) + (1   )K   H(K)   G(K);1   N(K);G(K)

+ V(H(K)).
Assuming an equilibrium with dierentiable policy functions exists, we can further characterize
it using the rst-order conditions of the government's problem.6 For clarity of exposition, let us
switch to short-hand notation, i.e., ignoring the arguments of functions. With associated Lagrange
multipliers  and  on the two constraints of the problem, the rst-order conditions are
 uc + V0
K + K0 + 	K0 = 0
ucFN   u` + N + 	N = 0
 uc + ug + G + 	G = 0;
where K0  K0 + K00H0
K + N0N 0
K + G0G0
K.
6Section 2.6 shows that a dierentiable equilibrium exists under specic assumptions. Among others, Krusell and
Smith (2003) and Martin (2009) report coexistence of dierentiable and non-dierentiable Markov-perfect equilibria.
Ortigueira and Pereira (2008) report multiplicity of dierentiable Markov-perfect equilibria. Krusell et al. (2006)
analyze an economy where the fundamental equilibrium (the limit of nite horizon equilibria) is non-dierentiable.
7We can use the last two equations above to solve for the Lagrange multipliers:
 =
	N(ug   uc)   	G(ucFN   u`)
N	G   G	N
 =  
N(ug   uc)   G(ucFN   u`)
N	G   G	N
:
The envelope condition implies
VK = uc(FK + 1   ) + K + 	K:
We thus get (arranged by wedges)
 uc + u0
c(F0
K + 1   ) +
(ucFn   u`)(G	K0   	GK0)
N	G   G	N
 































Since this equation contains the derivatives of policy functions, it is typically called a Generalized
Euler Equation or GEE.
There are ve policy wedges the government is internalizing. Each of these would be equal to
zero at the rst-best allocation (which would be implemented if lump-sum taxes were available).
Two wedges are directly created by current policy, while the other three are created by future policy
and thus, depend on the eects of current and future policy on capital accumulation.
First, we have the current distortions created by the use of linear taxation: ucFN   u` and
ug   uc. The former is the consumption-leisure wedge and the latter is the ineciency in public
good provision. These two wedges cannot be eliminated simultaneously: public goods are created
with an inecient transformation of private goods (linear taxes) and this same technology reduces
the incentives to supply labor. Second, capital accumulation aects policy in the following period.






and  uc + u0
c(F0
K + 1   ). The last wedge is the eect of future income taxes on current capital
accumulation. The current government cannot directly control any of these three wedges, but can
aect their magnitude by controlling the eects of its own policies on current savings.
Note that there is no wedge created by current policy on capital accumulation, since from
the perspective of the current government capital is supplied inelastically. One way to make the
government view the current taxation of capital as distortionary, is to allow for variable capital
utilization|see Martin (2010).
2.5 Lack of within-period commitment: \simultaneous actions"
Suppose now that the government cannot commit to an announcement within the period. Speci-
cally, income taxes are set at the same time as factor markets operate and production takes place.
In this scenario, the current government does not internalize the eects its policy has on current
labor decisions. Unlike the previous case, the government now takes N = N(K) as given. Thus,
8we can write the government's problem as choosing K0 and G, subject to households behaving
competitively, as characterized by (4) and N(K), given future anticipated policy G(K), which in
turn, implements future household behavior characterized by N(K) and H(K), and provides net
present value utility V(K). net present value utility V(K). Note that (5) is no longer a constraint
in the government's problem|it has been replaced by the function N(K).
The problem of the government can be written as
max
K0;G
u(F(K;N(K)) + (1   )K   G   K0;1   N(K);G) +  V(K0)
subject to
(K;K0;H(K0);N(K);N(K0);G;G(K0)) = 0: (9)
Denition 2 When the government lacks within-period commitment, a Markov-perfect equilibrium
is a set of functions fH;N;G;Vg : R+ ! R+  [0;1]  R+  R, such that for all K > 0:
(i) fH(K);G(K)g = argmaxfK0;Gg u(F(K;N(K))+(1 )K  G K0;1 N(K);G)+V(K0)
subject to (9);
(ii) 	(K;H(K);N(K);G(K)) = 0;
(iii) V(K) = u
 
F(K;N(K)) + (1   )K   H(K)   G(K);1   N(K);G(K)

+ V(H(K)).
With associated Lagrange multiplier  on the constraint of the government's problem, the
rst-order conditions are
 uc + V0
K + K0 = 0
 uc + ug + G = 0;
where K0  K0 + K00H0
K + N0N 0
K + G0G0
K, as dened above. From the second equation, we





The envelope condition implies
VK = uc(FK + 1   ) + (ucFN   u`)NK + (K + NNK);




















In this case, the government is internalizing four wedges, which is one less than in the case with
within-period commitment. The missing distortion is ucFN   u`, since the government decides on
policy at the same time as factor markets operate and therefore, does not internalize the eects
of current policy on the labor supply. Note however, that the current government does internalize
the eect of policy on tomorrow's labor supply, i.e., the wedge u0
cF0
N   u0
`. The reason is that
the government can indirectly aect this future distortion, by how its policy actions aect current
capital accumulation.
92.6 Analytical solutions
Under suitable assumptions, we can show the existence of dierentiable Markov-perfect equilibria
by solving analytically the problems specied above. More general cases need to be analyzed using
numerical methods. The algorithm for nding analytical solutions is as follows: (i) assume T < 1
and use the fact that KT+1 = 0 to solve the problem of the government using backwards induction;
(ii) use the nite-horizon solution for the initial period and take the limit as the horizon goes to
innity to obtain stationary policy functions. An equilibrium found this way is the limit of nite
horizon equilibria, which ensures that we are comparing equilibria of the same type. The algebraic
details of the backward iteration are omitted here for brevity, but the procedure is described in
Martin (2010).
Consider the following assumptions, which are standard for obtaining analytical solutions in
this type of environment.
Assumption 1 u(c;1   n;G) = c lnc + ` ln(1   n) + g lnG, c;`;g > 0.
Assumption 2 F(K;N) = KN1 ,  2 (0;1).
Assumption 3  = 1,  = 0.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then, the Markov-perfect equilibria with
and without within-period commitment are equivalent and characterized by the following functions:








 1 and  
g(1 )
c+g .
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that these functions satisfy the equilibrium conditions for the
respective cases, i.e., the two rst-order conditions from the agent's problem and the GEE from
the government's problem.
Under Assumptions 1|3, which allow for a closed-form solution, both environments analyzed
in the previous section yield identical equilibria. The reason is that under these assumptions, labor
is not a function of capital, and therefore, it does not matter whether the government internalizes
the eects of its policy on labor decisions or not.
3 Numerical Evaluation
3.1 Calibration
Let us maintain Assumptions 1 and 2, which specify the functional forms for the utility and
production functions. Preference parameters are normalized to unity, i.e., c +` +g = 1. Thus,
10let c  (1   g) and ` = (1   )(1   g), where  2 (0;1). Period length is equal to a year.
The calibration is borrowed from Klein et al. (2008), to facilitate comparisons to that paper and
subsequent work that adopted the same parameterization|see Table 1. Throughout the paper,
let the benchmark case be the environment with within-period commitment, which for benchmark
parameters roughly matches the post-war U.S. economy.7 To calibrate , which was implicitly set
to 1 in Klein et al. (2008), I use \Corporate Capital Consumption Allowances" from the National
Income and Product Accounts (see NIPA Table 6.22). The coecient of depreciation allowance
is obtained from dividing corporate capital consumption allowances by the total depreciation of
private capital and consumer durables. The average between 1962 and 2006 is 42%.
Table 1: Benchmark Parameters
Parameter  g    
Value 0:300 0:130 0:960 0:360 0:080 0:420
The numerical algorithm used to approximate the Markov-perfect equilibrium in each case is a
variant of a standard projection method. First, dene a grid over K. Second, make initial guesses
for the value of the functions H, N and G at each gridpoint. The number of unknowns is thus three
times the number of gridpoints. Third, solve a system of equations, which includes the two rst-
order conditions of the agent's problem and the GEE from the government's problem, evaluated at
all the gridpoints. Thus, the number of equations is three times the number of gridpoints. Since
some of the equations include variables evaluated at K0, we need to interpolate the values of policy
functions between gridpoints; for this, I use cubic splines. Hence, for each update in the guess, the
splines are also updated. To solve the equilibrium I use 50 gridpoints. To verify the approximation,
I evaluate the resulting functions at 1,000 gridpoints within the grid end-points and take the sum
of squared residuals of the equations used. As a reference, using benchmark parameters, the sum
of squared residuals for the GEE in each case is 8e 12 and 3e 11.
All welfare calculations conducted below are done in terms of private-good consumption equiva-
lent compensation. Consider two dierent economies (which share preference parameters), a and b,
and let (K) be the permanent fraction of private-good consumption that an agent would be willing
to give up in order to be indierent between staying in economy a and switching to economy b, for
any level of capital K. Given the assumptions on preferences, the corresponding welfare measure
is dened as
(K)  exp





Table 2 shows the steady state statistics at benchmark parameters. As a reference, the table
includes the statistics for the rst-best (i.e., with lump-sum taxes) and the Ramsey planner (full
7Target statistics for the environment with within-period commitment are standard: a capital-output ratio of 2:5
(where capital is dened as private capital plus consumer durables), private consumption roughly three times public
goods provision, a share of capital income in total income of about one-third, government expenditure to GDP of
20% and hours worked about one quarter of discretionary time.
11intertemporal commitment) long-run allocations.8
Table 2: Steady State Statistics
First-Best Ramsey Within-Period No Within-Period
Planner Commitment Commitment
K=Y 2:959 2:306 2:449 2:276
G=Y 0:254 0:259 0:205 0:271
C=G 2:008 2:145 2:923 2:021
K 1:906 0:966 1:063 0:946
N 0:350 0:262 0:262 0:262
   0:281 0:223 0:293
Relative to the rst-best, both Markov taxation cases exhibit too little capital and labor, which
is a typical result in models with linear income taxes. When the government is endowed with
within-period commitment (i.e., moves rst), the provision of public goods is ineciently low. In
contrast, when the government lacks within-period commitment, the provision of public goods is
too high. In the latter case, the government does not internalize the eect of taxes on the labor
supply, so it implements a higher tax rate|and therefore, higher public good provision|than when
it can commit at the beginning of the period. The fact that public good provision ends up being
too high follows from the ways the government internalizes all other wedges, as we shall analyze
below.
3.3 Policy and welfare








uc, thus providing a comparable measure of deviation from the
rst-best, where they would all be equal to one. Recall that governments internalize distortions
created today, as a result of current policy, and tomorrow, as a result of future policy, which in
turn is aected by current capital accumulation|see equations (8) and (10).
All three distortion ratios are larger than one when the government can commit within the pe-
riod. The government internalizes all wedges and thus, smoothes distortions across margins. When
the government lacks within-period commitment, it no longer internalizes the current distortion
on the consumption-leisure margin, ucFN   u`. Thus, to compensate for all the wedges it cannot
directly control, i.e., the intertemporal distortion,  uc + u0
c(F0






c, the government reduces the current wedge between private and public goods
consumption, ug   uc. The result is higher tax rates and public good provision.
In both cases, taxes and the provision of public goods are increasing in the capital stock. When
the government cannot commit within the period, tax rates increase faster with capital since the
distortion on the labor market is not internalized|see left panel of Figure 2. Thus, as capital
increases, ug   uc decreases and eventually becomes negative, counterbalancing all other (future)
8See Appendix B for a formulation and characterization of the Ramsey problem. Klein et al. (2008) provide a
thorough comparison between Ramsey and Markov-perfect policies, so I omit a similar analysis here.
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distortions the government cannot directly control. Higher tax rates imply that the intertemporal
wedge,  uc + u0
c(F0
K + 1   ), although qualitatively similar, is larger without within-period
commitment.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the welfare implications of losing within-period commitment.
Using the denition above, (K) measures the permanent fraction of private-good consumption
that an agent would be willing to give up in order to be indierent between staying in an economy
with within-period commitment (economy a) and switching to an environment without (economy
b). For the range of capital levels displayed in the chart, there is a welfare gain from losing the
ability to commit within the period. If we were to start at the steady state in the economy with
within-period commitment, the welfare gain would be equivalent to a permanent increase in private
consumption of 0:52%. This is a result often found in second-best economies, in which an additional
friction compensates for other ineciencies. In this case, not internalizing labor market distortions
implies a higher public good provision, which brings welfare closer to the rst-best. Welfare gains
are decreasing in the capital stock, since the cost of higher tax rates increasingly erode the gains
from larger public good consumption. The right panel of Figure 1 shows how, without within-period
commitment, the ucFN  u` wedge rises at an increasing rate with capital, i.e., the non-internalized
consumption-leisure distortion is increasing and convex in the tax rate.
There are three critical elements determining the welfare properties of losing within-period
commitment, which are dealt with in the remaining sections, one at a time. First, how the tax
base varies with the capital stock aects the slope of the tax function, and thus, the magnitude
of distortions created by linear taxation. An important institutional variable in this respect is the
capital depreciation allowance, which aects taxable income. Second, how much the government
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with within-period commitment is undersupplying the public good has a direct implication on the
gains from ignoring the consumption-leisure wedge in order to correct the public good distortion.
Third, the costs of ignoring the distortion created by taxation on the labor supply depend funda-
mentally on its elasticity. A less elastic labor supply would bring closer the policies implemented
by governments that internalize or ignore the consumption-leisure wedge.
3.4 Policy experiment: varying capital depreciation allowance
Deductions to taxable income reduce the tax base and therefore, imply higher tax rates to nance
a given level of expenditure. Hence, tax deductions have a direct eect on the magnitude of policy
distortions and the welfare properties of institutional reform. In this paper, the only tax deduction
is a proportion  of capital depreciation. As a reference, the measured  in the U.S. since 1962 has
uctuated between roughly 34% and 51%, averaging 42%.9
The left panel of Figure 3 displays steady state tax rates as a function of , under the two
Markov-perfect taxation regimes considered. As we can see, the steady state tax rate without
within-period commitment grows at a faster rate with  than when the government moves-rst. As
the tax base decreases with a larger deduction, public good provision would decrease if tax rates
were left the same. This eect provides an incentive for higher tax rates, regardless of the degree
of commitment. Since a government lacking within-period commitment does not internalize the
9Using the historical series from NIPA we can measure  annually since 1929. The average over the whole sample,
1929-2010, is 36%.
14distortion of higher taxes on the current labor supply, it increases taxes more.



















































Note: Welfare is measured at the steady state of the economy with within-period commitment.
As shown in the right panel of Figure 3, varying  has important welfare implications. If
the government can commit within the period, then the best policy is to increase the capital
depreciation allowance up to its maximum. The main reason is that a higher capital depreciation
allowance mitigates the intertemporal (savings) distortion, which results in a wealthier economy.
Relative to the benchmark steady state, a reform that increases  to 100% yields gains equivalent
to a permanent increase in consumption of 0:52%. Note that this gain is the same as that of losing
within-period commitment, as analyzed in the previous section.
If the government does not have within-period commitment, then the optimal value for  is
close to benchmark. Setting  to 50% implies a welfare gain of 0:54% in consumption equivalent
terms, relative to the benchmark steady state. Thus, if we start with an economy without within-
period commitment, the gains from moving  from its benchmark value are very small: roughly
worth 0:02% of consumption. However, varying  substantially may imply big losses. For example,
relative to benchmark, losing within-period commitment and setting  to 100% implies a loss
equivalent to a permanent reduction in consumption of about 2%. These calculations provide a
good example of how assuming extreme values of  (i.e., either zero or one) can lead to misleading
welfare results.
153.5 Lack of commitment and the size of government
As mentioned above, the gains from losing within-period commitment come from correcting the
inecient provision of public goods. It follows that these gains would be lower if the distortion
was not too high to begin with. Consider then an alternative experiment. Suppose the U.S.
economy is explained by the case without within-period commitment. This involves a small change
in preference parameters: g = 0:095. Table 3 displays the corresponding steady state statistics.
As we can see, the economy without within-period commitment now features the same steady state
statistics as the benchmark economy in Table 2.
Table 3: Steady State Statistics when g = 0:095
First-Best Ramsey Within-Period No Within-Period
Planner Commitment Commitment
K=Y 2:959 2:459 2:547 2:450
G=Y 0:198 0:201 0:167 0:205
C=G 2:858 2:992 3:764 2:928
K 1:779 1:070 1:132 1:064
N 0:327 0:262 0:263 0:262
   0:219 0:183 0:223
Note: All other parameters are at benchmark.
The dierences between the two Markov taxation economies are still signicant, but much less
pronounced than in Table 2. For example, for the benchmark parameterization, steady state tax
rates diered by 7 percentage points. Now, with a lower optimal supply of the public good, tax rates
dier by 4 percentage points. Naturally, the welfare dierences across environments are smaller as
well. Starting from the steady state of the economy without within-period commitment, the loss
from obtaining this commitment ability is equivalent to a permanent decrease in consumption of
0:33%. Recall than in the benchmark case, the gain from losing within-period commitment was
0:52%, which is signicantly higher. Another important dierence between parameterizations, is
that the welfare measure as a function of capital, (K), becomes atter as we lower g.
We can revisit the policy experiment of varying , using this alternative benchmark. Figure 4
shows the eects of varying  on steady state taxes and welfare, keeping the same vertical axis as
in Figure 3, for comparison with the results in the previous section.
As argued above, the eects of institutional reforms are now less dramatic since a lower g
implies the Markov taxation economies are closer to the optimal allocation. When the government
can commit within a period, the best policy is still to allow all of the capital depreciation to be
deducted from taxable income. Relative to the alternative benchmark, gaining the ability to commit
within a period and setting  = 1 has no eect on welfare. This is congruent with the result in the
previous section, for the benchmark case, where the gain from losing within-period commitment
was basically equivalent to the gain of setting the depreciation allowance to 100%.
If the U.S. economy is described by the model where the government cannot commit within the
period then welfare would improve if the depreciation allowance were increased. Setting  to 90%

















































Note: Welfare is measured at the steady state of the economy that lacks within-period commitment.
would increase welfare by 0:25% in consumption equivalent compensation terms. Note that going
all the way to 100% would still be benecial relative to benchmark, although marginally worse than
the optimal choice.
3.6 Alternative specications: labor supply elasticity
A more general specication for the utility function could be:
u(c;1   n;G) = (1   g)lnc +
(1   )(1   g)(1   n)1 
1   
+ g lnG;
where  would determine the labor-supply elasticity and aect the magnitude of the consumption-
leisure wedge. In the benchmark case, we assumed  = 1.
Table 4 shows the eects of recalibrating the benchmark economy assuming  = 2. The only
other parameters that change are  and g. As we can see, the two Markov taxation economies
are more similar than under the benchmark parameterization.
When the government cannot commit within the period, a less elastic labor supply implies a
lower cost from tomorrow's consumption-leisure wedge, which results in lower incentives to increase
public good provision to counterbalance distortions. Thus, taxes and public good provision are not
17Table 4: Steady State Statistics when  = 2,  = 0:367, g = 0:147
First-Best Ramsey Within-Period No Within-Period
Planner Commitment Commitment
K=Y 2:959 2:333 2:449 2:337
G=Y 0:244 0:249 0:205 0:248
C=G 2:129 2:266 2:919 2:281
K 1:771 1:219 1:061 0:985
N 0:325 0:262 0:262 0:262
   0:224 0:224 0:269
Note: All other parameters are at benchmark.
as high as in the benchmark parameterization. The welfare gains from losing commitment are
similar in steady state, 0:54%, but the prole in terms of capital is much atter. In other words,
with a less elastic labor supply, the welfare gains from losing within-period commitment are more
consistent across dierent levels of capital.
4 Concluding Remarks
A general, albeit not altogether novel, lesson is that the welfare properties of policy depend on the
margins the government perceives as being distorted. In some cases, correcting certain distortions
while ignoring others may improve welfare. Varying the degree of commitment is one way to alter
the distortions being internalized by the government.
When a government can only commit to policies within a period and is restricted to follow a
balanced budget rule, it provides an ineciently low level of public goods. If it loses the ability to
commit within the period then it no longer internalizes policy distortions on current factor markets.
The government then mitigates the private-public goods distortion by increasing taxes and public
good provision. This new policy may, in some cases, improve welfare.
For the calibrated economies presented in this paper, the potential welfare gains from losing
within-period commitment are modest, about half a percent of yearly consumption. Similar gains
can be obtained, if instead, capital depreciation were allowed to be fully deducted from taxable
income. However, depending on the details of the underlying economy and which other reforms are
being enacted simultaneously, loss of within-period commitment may potentially lead to substantial
welfare losses.
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20A Alternative specications for simultaneous actions
A.1 Case 1: simultaneous actions with consumption as residual
Here, we consider the case when the household decides savings and labor at the same time as the
government sets the tax rate and thus, consumption is determined as a residual. In other words,
if the current government were to deviate from the expected tax rule, the households would not
know their consumption until after observing the tax rate. The problem of the current government
can be written as
max
G
u(F(K;N(K)) + (1   )K   G   H(K);1   N(K);G) + V(H(K)):
Notice that the current government takes current savings and labor as given, but can aect
current consumption. Since savings are not aected by current government actions, the problem of
the government is static.
Denition 3 Alternative Case 1. When households and the government move simultaneously,
and consumption is determined residually at the end of the period, a Markov-perfect equilibrium is
a set of functions fH;N;G;Vg : R+ ! R+  [0;1]  R+  R, such that for all K > 0:











(iv) V(K) = u
 
F(K;N(K)) + (1   )K   H(K)   G(K);1   N(K);G(K)

+ V(H(K)).
The rst-order condition of the government's problem implies
uc = ug: (11)
This is the same condition that a government with access to lump-sum taxes would implement.
Thus, when consumption is determined as a residual, government policy eliminates the wedge
between private and public good consumption. However, the economy is not at the rst-best;
we still have the wedges between consumption and leisure, and current and future consumption.
Note that under special assumptions, a government with full intertemporal commitment would
implement the same long-run allocation|see Proposition 3 in Appendix B.
A.2 Case 2: simultaneous actions with savings as residual
Now assume that households choose consumption and labor at the same time as the government
chooses the tax rate. Thus, savings are left as a residual. This environment corresponds to the one
analyzed by Ortigueira (2006). The problem of the current government can be written as
max
G
u(C(K);1   N(K);G) + V(F(K;N(K) + (1   )K   G   C(K)):
In this case, the problem of the government is dynamic, since policy aects capital accumulation.
21Denition 4 Alternative Case 2. When households and the government move simultaneously,
and savings are determined residually at the end of the period, a Markov-perfect equilibrium is a
set of functions fC;H;N;G;Vg : R+ ! R2
+  [0;1]  R+  R, such that for all K > 0:











(iv) F(K;N(K)) + (1   )K   C(K)   G(K)   H(K) = 0;
(v) V(K) = u
 
F(K;N(K)) + (1   )K   H(K)   G(K);1   N(K);G(K)

+ V(H(K)).
The rst-order condition of the government's problem is
ug   V0
K = 0: (12)
The envelope condition implies
VK = ucCK   u`NK + V0
K(FK + 1    + FNNK   CK);
which after using ug = V0
K from (12) implies the following GEE
 ug + u0
g(F0








From the resource constraint, CK = FK + FNNK   GK   HK, and thus,
 ug + u0
c(F0








K = 0: (13)
This way of writing the GEE makes all the dierent cases easier to compare, as they can all be
solved in terms of fH;N;Gg only.
A.3 Analytical solutions
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then, for all K > 0 the equilibrium policy
functions for Alternative Case i = f1;2g are:
Hi(K) = (1   i)KN1 









c+g(1 ) and 2 
g(1 )
c+g(2 ).
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that these functions satisfy the equilibrium conditions for
the respective cases, i.e., the two rst-order conditions from the agent's problem, the GEE from
the government's problem, the resource constraint and the government budget constraint.
22A.4 Numerical results
Table 5 extends Table 2 to include the steady state statistics of the two alternative cases described
above. The last line displays the welfare gain from switching from the benchmark economy with
within-period commitment. As we can see, the variants without within-period commitment feature
very similar steady state statistics. Welfare gains from losing commitment are highest for \Alter-
native Case 1", since the private-public good distortion is completely eliminated. Note that the
consumption equivalent compensation is only 0:004 percentage points higher than in the standard
no within-period commitment case.
Table 5: Steady State Statistics for Benchmark Parameters
Within-Period No Within-Period Alternative Alternative
Commitment Commitment Case 1 Case 2
K=Y 2:449 2:276 2:272 2:273
G=Y 0:205 0:271 0:272 0:272
C=G 2:923 2:021 2:008 2:012
K 1:063 0:946 0:943 0:944
N 0:262 0:262 0:262 0:262
 0:223 0:293 0:295 0:294
 0:00% 0:52% 0:52% 0:48%
The three cases with lack of within-period commitment become more dierentiated as we move
towards extreme values for . The largest dierences occur when  = 1, which implies steady state
tax rates of 0:332, 0:468 and 0:407, for the standard case, alternative case 1 and alternative case 2,
respectively. For this parameterization, switching from within-period commitment to alternative
case 1 would imply a welfare gain, whereas switching to the other two cases without within-period
commitment would imply (large) welfare losses. These calculations are available upon request.
B The Ramsey problem
Suppose the government can commit at time zero to all future policy decisions, but is subjected to
a balanced budget constraint, as in Stockman (2001) and Klein et al. (2008). The problem of the










F(Kt;Nt) + (1   )Kt   Gt;1   Nt;Gt

+ t(Kt;Kt+1;Kt+2;Nt;Nt+1;Gt;Gt+1) + t	(Kt;Kt+1;Nt;Gt)
o
23given K0 and a standard transversality condition. Switching to short-hand notation, the rst-order
conditions are
 uc;t + uc;t+1(1    + FK;t+1) +  1t 1K00;t 1 + tK0;t + t+1K;t+1 + t	K0;t + t+1	K;t+1 = 0
uc;tFN;t   u`;t +  1t 1N0;t 1 + tN;t + t	N;t = 0
 uc;t + ug;t +  1t 1G0;t 1 + tG;t + t	G;t = 0:
In the long-run, the allocation fK;N;G;;g solves
(K;K;K;N;N;G;G) = 0 (14)

























G = 0: (18)
The following result relates the steady state of Markov case 1 with the Ramsey long-run allo-
cation (Klein, Krusell and R os-Rull, 2008 make a similar observation).
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if  = 1 then the long-run Ramsey allocation coincides
with the Markov Case 1 steady state.




G = 0, so that (18) simplies to u
c = u
g, which is identical to (11). Thus, fK;N;Gg is also
the steady state of Case 1.
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